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ALUMNI NOTES.
A movement has been started among
the Dickinson Law School graduates residing in Scranton and Wilkesbarre to organize an Alumni Association to be composed of graduates of the Law School and
College who are located in that partof the
state. In the territory that would be embraced by the association are about two
hundred Dickinson men, many of whom
are prominent in public life, and nearly all
of whom are enjoying more than ordinary
success. The initiatory steps toward
effecting an organization have been taken
and it is probable that in the near future
its advent will be appropriately celebrated.
John M. Rhey, '96, kindly presented, for
the library, a copy of Sinull's Legislative
Hand Book for 1901.
P. l. Graul, '01, of Lehighton, was one
of the first of his class to be admitted to
the bar of his home county, having been
admitted June 12th. He has since been
elected Borough Solicitor and is also en-

joying a fitir share of the business in-his
home town.
John R. Hemminger, '96, has been elected District Attorney of Butler County by
a majority of seven hundred votes.
DevalI, '99, has been elected District
Attorney of Potter County.
Thomas E. Vale, a former student of the
school, has been elected District Attorney
of Cumberland County.
Among the visitors in town during, the
month were: Samuel Baehore, '01, D. Edward Long, '98, John G. Miller, '00, Daniel
Kline, '01, G. Arthur Bolte, '00, and James
N. Lightner, '01.
Ruby R. Vale, '99, has presented to the
library of the School, a copy of his work
on Elementary Principles of Pennsylvania
Law in two volumes. Its preparation has
involved great labor, and it is a credit to
its author, and to thisschool of which he
is an alumnus.
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THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
During the month a very interesting
talk was given by Mr. Kaufnan on the
death of President MeKinley, in which he
discussed Anarchy and Free Speech- Deep
thought in its preparation was evidenced.
Mr. Welsh entertained us with several
humorous selections. Mr. McKeehan interestingly described the amusements of
the people of Paris. He also commented
on the closing addresses of Attorney-General Raynor, of Maryland, and Captain
Lemly, judge-advocate, in the Schley inquiry. It was Mr. McI(eehan's good fortune to hear these addresses. There were
surprisingly few flights of oratory in either
address, he said, and yet they were marvelously effective.
The remarks by Messrs. Flynn and Wilcox on political questions were greatly enjoyed as was also White's thoughtful essay
The following officers were
on "Success."
elected:
President-Crary.
Vice-President-White.
Secretary-Welsh.
Treasurer-Yocum.
Executive com.-Brennan, Walsh, Donahoe.
THE DICKINSON LAW SOCIETY.
The work of the Dickinson Law Society
for the past month has approached the
standard previously maintained. It has
continued its former policy of having debates and assigning current topics for dihcussion, whereby the chief object of the
society, which is to enable its members to
obtain facility in public speaking, might
be attained even at the expense of the programs being less entertaining. On October
26th, the work was varied by having ajury
trial, the entire proceedings being conducted according to court practice. Mr.
Davis was counsel for the prosecution and
Mr. Points for the defendant. The manner in which it was carried through
showed careful preparation.
At a recent election for officers of the
society, Mr. Schanz was chosen president
and Mr. Williamson secretary. On taking
the chair, Mr. Schanz, in response to calls
for a speech, talked of the importance of
all the members taking an active part in
society work, and of the value of the op-

portunity offered for attaining proficiency
in public address and of the benefit to be
derived from taking advantage of the
training offered. Mr. Lanard gave some
convincing reasons why President Roosevelt should not have invited Booker T.
Washington to dine with him. We have
every reason to believe the future outlook
for the society is bright, as the new members are capable and are showing a lively
interest hi the work.
DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
The Delta Chi fraternity begins the year
in splendid condition. Earnestinterest is
shown in its affairs. The new men initiated thus far are: Fleitz, Donahoe, Hugus,
Dively, Hilyer, Wilson, and Knappenberger. The chapter adopted thefollowing
resolutions on the death of E. H. Hoffman:
Hoffman, a former
WHEREAS, E. H.
nivmber of the Dickinson Chapter of Delta
Chi Fraternity, has through the wisdom of
God been summoned from earth,
Be It Resolved, that by his death we suffer the loss of one who was a loyal, earnest
and enthusiastic brother in the fraternity,
and a warm and true friend to all who
were associated with him in the fraternity
life. Generous and kindhearted to a
marked degree, he spoke evil of no man,
and made fast friends of all whom he met.
His memory will ever be cherished in the
fraternity, and his influence will long be
felt among us.
Be it further Besolved, That these resolutions be spread upon the minutes of our
chapter; that copies be sent to the family
of our late brother; and that they be
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The following is a continuation of the
Moot Court cases published last month:
Case.

No. 19.

No. 20.

No. 21.

No. 22.

Plaintiff.

Defendant.

Lonergan,
Houser,
Rhodes, F.
McIntyre,
Davis, J.
Rhodes, J.,
McKeehan,
Logan.
Thorne,
Conry, J.
Keeler,
Crary,
Ebbert.
Gerber,
Bouton, J.
Core,
Brennan,
Delaney, Ed.
Dever,
Claycomb, J.
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Case.

Plaintiff.

Defendant.

No. 23.

Cannon,
Lauer,
Cooper,
Schanz.
Williamson, J.
No. 24. Bishop,
Stauffer,
Donahoe,
Delaney, Leroy.
Ebbert, S.
No. 2.5. Minnich,
Sterrett,
Turner,
Conry.
MaeConnell, J.
No. 26. Claycomb,
Hickernell,
Hoagland,
Fox.
Donahoe, J.
No. 27. Kaufman,
Bouton,
Jones,
Mays.
Dever, J.
No. 28. Kline,
Peightel,
Myers.
Schnee.
Mowry, J.
No. 29. Longbottom,
Mf iller,
Wanner,
Hamblen.

No. 30. Phillips,
Walsh,
No. 31.

No. 32.

No. 38.

No. 34.

No. 35.

No. 36.

No. 37.
No. 38.
No. 39.
No. 40.

Welsh, J.
Sherbiie,
Watson.

Crary, J.
Vastine,
Wright,
Welsh,
Mowry.
Schanz, J.
Thorne,
Lonergan,
Williamson,
Crary.
Adamson, J.
Yeagley,
Brennan,
Ebbert,
Lauer.
Gerber, J.
Claycomb,
Keelor,
Gross,
Delaney, Ed.
Hickernell, J.
Dever,
Cooper,
Cannon,
Delaney, Leroy.
Jones, J.
Core,
Donahoe,
Fox,
Hoagland.

Kline, J.
Gerber,
Schanz,
Elmes,
McK~ehan.
Points, J.
Adamson,
Rhodes, F.
Jones,
Bishop.
Laubenstein, J.
Davis,
Brock,
MacConnell,
Rhodes, J.
Houser, J.
Myers,
Walsh,
Bouton,
Hickernell.
Keelor, 3.
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BOOK REVIEWS.
The tol]lowing books are ack nowledged.
Reviews will follow.
THiE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

71,f

Edwapd

A rerl 1-arriman. Second 1dition. Ret'i.rd and enlarged. Little, Brown & Co.,
1
0oston,
1901.
TiIm BRIEF ON THE FACTS. Second
volume o.f the "Abbot Trial Brief" series.
B1y Austin Abbot. Second and Enlarged
Edition. The Lawyers' Co-operati'ePubii8ldng Co., Rochester, N . i; 1901.
TiIE LAW OF AGENCY. Including the
Law of -'incilpaland Agent and the Lan'
of iaster and Servant. .By Eret
IV.
Ifqfffut, P'ofe.ssor of Law in the Cornell
Univerr4it ('ollege of Law. Second E0dilion. .Revised and Anlarged. Boston:
Little, Brown & Co. 1901, pp. LI, .10".
This is practically a new work, for in
addition to revising and enlarging the discussion of the law of principal and agent,
the author has added a discussion of (lie
law of master and servant which cover,
something over one hundred pages. The
work is thus made to include the entire
field of agency-somethig which we
believe has not been systematically lccomplished in any other text. The subject of
master and servant has been generally
regarded as a branch of the law of domestic
relations, and has been so treated by text
writers. But without doubt the ternm
"-gency"is properly used to coverall forms
of representation, whether the representative be agent or servant. And, moreover,
while in earlier times servants werealways
members of the master's household, and
consequently the relation existing between
master and servant was essentially a domiestic relation, such is by no means the
case to-day. The author's treatment of
the subject as a part of the law of agency,
is therefore at oncescientificand practical,
and we predict that his example will be
generally followed by text writers and
teachers of law.
Another striking feature of the revised
edition is the discussion of the distinction
between the grounds of liability of a principal for the acts of an agent in excess of
authority and the grounds of liability of a
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master for acts of a servant in excess of
authority. This is done with a clearness
that has never before been approached.
In fact, the work throughout is marked by
a lucidity of analysis and exposition that
is extraordinary. The first edition has
been very widely used in the law schools,
and with the highest degree of satisfaction.
The new edition, with its added treatment
of the law of master and servant, and in
its attractive octavo form, seems to closely
approximate the ideal of a law school text.
The work should prove of great value to
the practitioner, as well as the student, for
while no attempt has been made to cite
a multitude of cases, care has been taken
to select an adequate number of those
which are well reasoned and authoritative.
THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL
By Francis ff. Burdick,
PROPERTY.
Dwight Professor of Law in Columbia
University School of Law. Second edition. Revised and enlarged. Boston:
Little, Brown & Co. .1901, pp. V1II, 299.
The first edition of this book was published four years ago, and won immediate
recognition as a work of exceptional merit.
It was marked by analytical power, discrimination in the selection of authorities,
and accuracy in the statement of legal
principles. In the new edition, the author,
profiting by experience in the use of the
book as a law school text, has carefully
revised a number of the sections, and,
moreover, has brought his work up to date
by the citation and discussion of many
new cases. Among the topics which are
more fully treated than before are "Reservation of the Right of Disposal," "Interest
as Damages" and "Conditions and Warrantids." Indeed, the discussion of the
very perplexing subject of conditions and
warranties occupies almost a quarter of
the book, and contains the pith of Professor Burdick's learned article which
appeared in the February number of the
Columbia Law Review.
The book is now published in octavo instead of duodecimo form, cites about two
thousand cases, and contains a most coinplete index and table of cases.

MOOT COURT.
HARPER M'FG. CO. vs. HOLLAND,
ETAL.
Statute oY Limitations-Necessity of
demand before filing bill to compel payment of Stock subscription-National
Bankruptcy Law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Holland and the other defendants sub
scribed to stock in varying quantities, from
a shares up to50; at$25.00per share,payable
in installments of ]0 per cent. at call.
After fourinstallments had been called and
paid, the company made an assignment for
creditors. The subscriptions were then
eight years old and the fourth call had
been made six years and two months before the assignment.
Two months after the assignment, the
assignee, Harper, filed a bill in equity to
compel payment of the remaining 60 per
cent. of stock. The debt was stated in the
bill to be twice the amount of the unpaid
stock plus any other assets of the corporation.
The defence was
1st. Statute of Limitation;
2d. Absence of demand on defendant before filing the bill;
3d. Filing of the bill before the assets
had been sold and theirvalue in cash then
ascertained;
4th. Invalidity of the plaintiffs title because the assignment was made after the
passage Qf the National Bankruptcy Law.
PoIN-Ts and MINNICH for plaintiff.
The Statute of Limitation did not begin to run till the assignment was made.
Franklin Saving Bank v. Bridges, 20 W.
N.C.43. Swearingenv. Sewickley Dairy
Co., 198 Pa. 68.
No demand was necessary before filing
the bill. Swearingen v. Sewickley Dairy
Co. Supra. Milnes Appeal, 99 Pa. 483.
MooN and RHODES, F., for defendant.
The suit is barred by the Statute of
Limitations. Pittsburg & Connellsville
I. R. Co. v. Byers, 32 Pa. 22. Id. v.
Graham, 36 Pa. 77.
Demand should have been made before
filing the bill, 68 Pa. 396, 37 Pa. 257, 102
Pa. 38.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It has recently been pointed out by
Justice Mitchell in Swearingen v. Dairy
Company, 198 Pa. 72,that thePennsylvanla
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cases are in apparent conflict upon the
question as to whether a call is necessary
before an action may be brought by the
offloers if a solvent corporation for unpaid
stock subscriptions and whether, if so. the
demand must be made within six years
from the time of the contract of subscription. As this is the vital question involved in the present case, it becomes our
duty to harmonize as far aspossible the.e
conflicting decisions.
If the decision of Pittsburg & Connellsville R. R. Co. v. Byers, 32 Pa. 22 is to be
regarded as of general application, itfollows
that the lapse of a period of six years from
the date of one call bars the right ever to
make any further calls. In the present
ease, six yearsand two months haveelapsed
between the time of the fourth call and that
of the assignment, and six years and four
months from the time of the fourth call
to that of the filingof this bill. In accordance with this decision, therefore, the statute would be a bar. However, we are convinced that an understanding of the circumstances in this case is essential to a
correct interpretation of this decision.
"The act of In corporation of this rail road
company," says the Court, "contemplated
anl early commencement and completion
of the road; for it provided that unless it
were begun within fiveyears, orif suffered
togo out of usefortwo years after completion, the charter should be forfeited.
It is not reasonable to suppose the legislature meant that subscribers to such a
stock should be indefinitely bound. The
road was to be promptly commenced and
vigorously maintained; and some of the
various remedies to compel payments of
the stock were to be resorted to within a
reasonable time." To our minds this quotation clearly indicates the real ground for
this decision. In Smith v. Bell, 107 Pa. 356
the following explanation of this case is
given: "The use made of the Statute of
Limitations was in establishing a reasonable timefor the company to undertake
the enterprise in good faith, and after the
lapse of which without such undertaking
an abandonment must be presumed. The
defendants were released, not by the bar of
the Statute, but under the terms of their
contract."
Criticising this same decision, the Court
in Wilbur v. The Stockholders, 39 Leg. Int

346 says: "Where the corporation is solvent, the unpaid capital is not due and
payable by the stockholders until payment
in part or in whole is called for by the corporate authorities, unless a postponement
would be inconsistent with some provision
of the Act of Incorporation,or with a conventional arrangenient with the stockholders. Ordinarily thereis nosuch inconsistency of either kind, and thus in thecase
ofasolventcorporation, a call or levy by the
corporate aul hori ties assessing the anunlit
oramounts payable must ordinarily precede any ascertained obligation of the
respective stockholders to pay. But in the
contrary case of an insolvent corporation
the recourse of its creditors does not depend
upon such condition precedent, and cannot
be thus postponed."
We are satisfied, therefore, that it was
not the mere lapse of time that resulted in
this decision, but the fact that the Act of
Incorporation made special provision for
such a contingency.
To the other cases cited by the learned
counsel for the defendant, in which the
said Pittsburg & Connellsburg R. R. was
a party, the same explanationis applicable.
While it is true that these cases are referred
to as good law and are regarded as standing for a general principle in both Franklin Savings Bank v. Bridges, 20W. N. C. 43
and in Swearingen v. Dairy Co. (supra),
still it must be noted that this question
was not necessary to the decision of either
of these cases, and the statements, therefore, are mere dicta. In both these later
cases the defence was successful because
more than six years had elapsed, not only
from the time of the last call, but also from
the time of the making of the assignment.
In the pre.sent case the bill was filed within
two months from the time of the assignment.
Laforge v. Jayne, 9 Barr 410, which, it
is contended, supports thisview, was overruled in doctrine, if not formally, by
Girard Bank v. Penn Township, 3 Wright
92, and the latter case was affirmed in
Finkborne's Appeal, 86 Pa. 370. While
Bell's Appeal, 18 W. N. C. 551 seems to
imply that the remedy would be barred
within six years from the incorporation or
subscription to thestock, yet a later portion
of the opinion implies that "creditors of a
corporation which had been in existence
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for many years, and whose original subscribers were dead and gone long before the
i nsolvency of the comnpany,' 1 mightcon pel
the original subseri bers and t he transferees
of sares to pay up unpaid installments.
See Trickett on Limitations to Personal
Actions, See. 218, N. 1.
In Scovill v. Thayor, 10.5 U. S. 143 gubscribers to stock, upon payment of 20 per
cent. on their shares, agreed with the corporation that no further assessrentshould
be made thereon and certificates for full
paid shares were issued to them. The corporation was adjudicated a bankrupt, and
to-satisfy the claims of its creditors it became necessary to assess the unpaid stock.
It was held that the agreement, though
binditig the parties, was void as to creditors
of the corporation. It was further held
that the cause of action did not accrue to
the assignee before the assignment.
Surely, if the assignee is not bound by the
formal agreement of the corporation, he
should not be bound by simple neglect on
the part of the officers of the corporation
to make a call.
We are. therefore, of the opinion that
until the insolvency of the corporation
appeared, the making of a call by the
authorities of the corporation was a condition precedent to the cause of action and
that the statute, accordingly, did not begin to run till the assignment was made.
The first defence is therefore denied.
The next question which arisesis whethera demand was still necessary, even after
the assignment, before the present bill
could be filed. In Franklin Savings Bank
v. Bridges, 20 W. N. C. 43 it is said: "conceding that the unpaid subscriptions when
realized would be a fund to be held for the
benefit of the depositors and other creditors
of the corporation, it is apparent that as
soon as the assignment was made, the
depositors and other creditors were entitled
through the assignee to demand that the
unpaid subscriptions should be paid. The
creditors were at that time in the position
of one to whom an obligation is due on
demand." In Myers v. Seeley, 10 Nat.
Bankruptcy Reg. 411 we find this statement: "If a company is insolvent the
original mode of making calls on stock is
not to be pursued in the enforcement of
the decree; for the debt is then due on the
stock without demand."

With reference to the defendant's second point we are of the opinion, therefore,
that. whilea demand was necessary before
th assignment, thereafter none was required before the filing of this bill, which
i.itself a sufficient demand.
Upon the defendant'sthird pointthe cases
are collected and the question discussed by
Justice Mitchell in Swearingen v. Dairy
Co. (supra). In Citizens & MinersSavings
was held
Bank v. Gillespie, 115 Pa. 564 it:
that whileordinarily an accountandassessinentare necessary to fix the amount of the
stockholders' liability on their unpaid
subscriptions, yet "the necessity for this
does not exist where the whole amount is
requiredto pay the debt.y. The assignee
may sueat once for all that isrequired.
The debts are stated in this bill to be twice
theamount of the unpaid stock plus all
other assets of the corporation. In just
such a case (Cornell's Appeal, 114 Pa. 123)
it was said: "The right of the complainant
to immediate and entire relief is not to be
delayed by any questionsof expediency, or
of the ultimate rights of defendants to contribution." From any standpoint, therefore, it is evident that in this case it was
not error to file the bill without awaiting
the sale of the assets and the ascertainment
of their cash valuation.
As to defendant's fourth point, we can
see no force in their reference to the NationalBankruptcyAct. The Act canhave
no application until this corporatiou is
shown to have been "engaged principally
in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing or mercantile pursuits." Nat.
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 4 A & B. This has
not been done.
We, therefore, deny all of defendant's
points and decree the payment of the remaining 60 per cent. unpaid stock subscriptions.
MCKEEHAN, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

The able opinion of the court below exempts us from the necessity of a protracted discussion of the principles involved in
this case.
I. The stock subscription was payable,
only in installments of ten percent., and at
call. It was not payable as soon as made,
nor could more than ten per cent. be demanded in any one call. The subscrip-
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tion was not payable oln demand. The
call was a necessary preliminary, and at
least ten calls, each for not more than ten
percent., were requisite prior to insolvency
to make the whole subscription due. In
the light of the more recent cases, and (f
principle, we cannot hold that the statute
of limitations began to run against it, until call, or until the overtact indicative
of insolvency, viz., the assignment for the
benefit of creditors.
2. We do not think a demand on the
defendants a necessary preliminary to
suit against them. "So long as the corporation is solvent the whole subscription
is due in accordance with its terms, and is
payable when and as called for by the corporation. But when the corporation becomes insolvent, the contract between it
and the subscriber is terminated, and his
debt to it is then only for such part of his
subscription as is required to pay the corporate debts." Swearingen v. Dairy Co.,
198 Pa. 68. The need for calls vanished
with the assignment.
3. The filing of the bill did not need to
wait until the assets of the corporation
had been administered andapplied to debts.
Indeed, had the assignee waited until
the completion of this administration, and
had the process extended over six years,
the lapse of that period would have been
a bar to the bill. Swearingen v. Dairy
Co. supra.
4. The assignment for the benefit of
creditors is not void because of the existence of the national bankrupt act. Beck
v. Parker, 65 Pa. 262; Tobin v. Trump,
7 Phila. 123. "In the absence of actual
fraud, an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, though constructively fraudulent under the bankrupt law, is not void
but voidable, and is voidable only at the
suit of the trustee in bankruptcy." Loveland's Bankruptcy, 305, 306. The assignment is an act of bankruptcy, but unless
proceedings to declare the corporation
bankrupt are begun, and the trustee appointed takes steps to avoid the assignment, it is, as to all others, inexpugnable.
Appeal dismissed.

EDWARD SEGRIST VS. MARTHA
SEGRIST.
Executory devise-Definite or indefinite
failure of issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Frank Segrist died, his will containing
the following: "I give my dwelling
house to my son James, provided that
during his life and )is mother's he paysto
her $100 a year and at his death without
issue his wife shall have it for her life and
after death it shalI go over to my son Edward or his heirs." The rental value of
the house was$400a year. Testator's widow lived 4 ye, rs after him, receiving annually from James $100. James survived her
5 years, when he died childless, but with
a widow to survive him, she remaining in
possession of the house. Edward brought
ejectment.
COOPER and KAUFMAN for plaintiff.
James Segrist took a fee-tail which by the
act of 1885 is made a fee simple. 137 Pa.
53, 81 Pa. 3:,9.
DE LANEY and LAUER for defendant.
A limitation over by will to survivors of
persons in being, after thedeath of the first
taker, raises a strong presumption that
testator did not contemplate an indefinite
failure of issue. 194 Pa. 611, 10 Pa. 498,
198 Pa. 162.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This was an action of ejectment brought
by Edward Segrist to recover possession
of a house and lot which he claimed under
the will of his father, Frank Segrist.
The father provided by his last will and
testament that his dwelling should go to
his son James "provided that during his
life and his mother's, he pays to her $100
per year. At his death without issue his
wife shall have it for her life, and after
her death it shall go over to my son Edward or his heirs."
The testator's widow lived four years
after his death and received annually from
James $100. James survived her five
years, when he died childless, but leaving
a widow, Martha Segrist, who remained
in possession of the dwelling, against
whom this action is brought.
The right of the plaintiff to recover depends upon what estate he took under his
father's will.
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It is our duty to ascertain the intention
of the testator, and to carry out that intention unless it is contrary to some well
established rule of law.
It is undoubtedly true that the first
sentence of the devise gives James an estate in fee. Had the testator added nothing beyond the description of the property
his son James would have taken a complete and indefeasible estate, but it is apparent that the testator did not intend
that James should have an estate free
from conditions as this first clause is followed by express restrictions.
The testator undoubtedly anticipated
the death of his son James without issue.
In that event he desired at the death of
his son and that of his wife, the land devised to the former should be enjoyed by
the plaintiff. With this in view and for
this purpose, he placed restrictions on the
devise to his son. It was clearly the testator's intention that if his son had issue
at the latter's death, his title should be indefeasible.
But the question for us to decide is
whether the testator contemplated a definite failure of issue. The testator provides that his son James shall have his
dwelling; that at his death without issue,
his wife shall have it for her life and after
her death it shall go over to his son Edward or his heirs.
Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 9 Watts, 447
is a leading case on this subject and follows the general rule, but Justice Sergeant lays down this exception: "When
the time at which the devise over is to
take effect is expressly or impliedly limited to a particular period within a life or
lives in being, and twenty one years
thereafter, or if the devise over be of a iife
estate which implies necessarily that such
devise over may outlive the first estate,
in all such cases the testator has been considered as meaning the failure of issue
within a fixed period and not an indefinite failure of issue.
In Hill v. Hill, 74 Pa. 176, after stating
the general rule that a devise in fee with a
limitation over upon the death of the first
taker, leaving no issue, reduces an estate
in fee to an estate tail, Justice Sharswood
says, "On the other hand it is equally
clear that if there is anything in the will
which indicates that the testator intend-

ed the word "issue" should not mean issue
definitely, but children, then this construction shall not apply.
In Bedford's Appeal, 40 Pa. 23, Mr. Justice Strong says, "that a limitation over
by will to survivors or persons in being
after the death of the first taker without
issue raises a strong presumption that the
testator did not contemplate an indefinite
failure of issue."
In Stinor v. Wemdersled, 198 Pa. 158,
the latest case on this subject, Justice
Mestrezat holds that a limitation over by
will to survivors or persons in being after
the death of the first taker without issue
raises a strong presumption that the testator did not contemplate an indefinite
failure of issue. The rule that a bequest
over in the event of the death of the first
taker refers to that event occurring-in the
life time of the testator is not applied
when the first taker is referred to or
treated as living at a period subsequent
to the death of the testator.
The limitation over in this case was to
the wife of James for her life, and it is very
evident that the testator contemplated a
definite failure of issue before her death.
The testator further contemplated that
his son would survive him, and the son
James took a fee determinable at his death
without issue, and the ulterior estates took
effect as executory devises.
Martha Segrist has, therefore, an estate
for her life in the dwelling, and this action
cannot be sustained.
Guy THORNE, J.
ESTATE OF JOHN TAYLOR.
Life iwurance-Parolassiqnmeft by insolvent debtor to wife-Act of April 15, 1868
-Claims of creditors.
STATE51ENT OF THE CASF,

Taylor, conscious of his insolvency, procured two policies of insurance on his life,
one for $2,000 and the other for $3,000. The
former was payable to his wife, the latter
to himself, executors or administrators.
Ak week after obtaining the $3,000 policy he
handed it to his wife, saying it was hers.
He had declared to her, before taking out
the policy, his intention to procure for her
$5,000 on his life, but had caused one of
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them to be made payable to himself, executors or administrators because he was intending to borrow $2,000 from a friend; a
rurpose which he abandoned and handed
the policy over to his wife. His administrator neglected to charge himself with
the $5,000although $3,000 had been paid to
him ol the policy. He had paid it over
to Taylor's widow. Taylor's creditors now
insist upon his being charged with the
$5,000. With the $5,0U0 added, the assets
would be only 30 per cent of the debts.
CANNON and BOuTON for creditors.
The assignment of the policy by an insolvent debtor in trust for his wife, is
fraudulent and void as against creditors.
Appeal of Elliot's, 50 Pa. 75; Bank v. McKeehan, 84 Mich. 62.5; Clay's Appeal, 50
Pa. 75.
BRENNAw and CLAYCOmB for executor.

The right to the policy of $2,000 vested
in the wife when it was taken out and was
never an asset of the estate. Act of April
15, 1868; 99 Pa. 133: 1l W. N. 0. 127.
Fraud is not to be inferred from the mere
fact of insolvency. 'Morrell's Estate, 8 W.
N. C. 183; Hallstead's Estate, 2 Kulp .508.
OPINTON OF THE COURT.

The case presents two questions. (1.) Can
an insolvent mail, by insuring his life for
the benefit of his wife, vest in the wife a
title free from the claims of creditors?
There can be no doubt about it. Besides a
long line of authorities from 50 Pa. 75 to
198 Pa. 96, we have the act of April 15, 1868.
P. & L. Dig. 2383, which expressly provides
that, "all policies of life insurance * * *
which have been taken out for the benefit
of * * * the wife or children or any relative

dependent upon such person, shall be
vested in such wife or children or other
relative, free and clear from all claims of
the creditors of such person." Mr. Justice
Green in commenting upon this act in
McCutchion's Appeal, 99 Pa. 137, uses the
following language: "The very object and
purpose of the act was to enable insolvent
persons to make provision in this way for
their families or dependent relatives which
should be good and effective, as against
and free and clear of all claims of creditors "
It is obvious then that when this policy
was issued to Mrs. Taylor, her rights became vested, and that they cannot be divested without her consent. Such apolicy
constitutes a contract between the insurance company and the decedent, whereby
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the company agrees to pay the wife the
proceeds upon the death of her husband.
The law on this point is so clear that any
further discussion would be idle. We
therefore decline to interfere with the wise
disposition made of the first policy by the
administrator. The questions of friud,
parol and written assignments which
might arise in such a case will be discussed
further on.
The second and more difficult question
is: "In view of the fact that the decedent
had declared his intention to procure his
wife $5,000 on his life and also hishanding
over the policy to her with that intention,
is the wife entitled to the proceeds of the
policy payable to the legal representatives
of the insured?"
In giving a satisfactory answer to this
inquiry it is necessary first- to consider
what constitutes a valid transfer of an insurance policy, and also the question of
fraud. The decedent no doubt intended,
as he had declared, to make out both policies to his wife, but, being insolvent, it was
necessary for him to make out one for
"himself, executors and administrators,
etc." in order that he might borrow $2,000,
as he had intended to do, and deposit the
policy then as collateral security. This purpose, it is stated, he abandoned and thereupon handed the policy to his wife. Was
this a good transfer? We think it was.
In Malone's Estate, 8 W. N. C. 179. the
Judge said: "It is clearly shown by the
American authorities that any act on the
part of the owner of a chose in action,
showing not only a present intention to
transfer, but that he regarded himself as
having carried such intention into effect,
is sufficient and that no written evidence
The
of the transaction is required."
-learnedjudge could not have contemplated
a clearer illustration of the principle he
here lays down. The decedent handed his
wife the policy, saying it was hers. This
fact coupled with his previous declarations
of intention to procure for her $5, 000 on his
life, leaves no room for conjecture. Besides
this, it has been repeatedly held that a
policy of life insurance may be transferred
by mere delivery; East L. Co. v. Marsh,
91 Pa. 100; Wells v, Tucker, 3 Binney 366.
The counsel for the plaintiff have rested
their argument regarding the second
policy almost entirely upon the case of
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Elliott's Appeal, 50 Pa. 75. They might
with greater force have cited the late case
of McKown's estate, 198 Pa. 96. But both
caies fail ir. analogy to the one at bar.
These two cases may be said to be ruled
by the case of Lough's estate, 75 Pa. 115,
which holds that a gift of achose in action
or chattel cannot be made by words in futuro or words in praesentiunaccompanied by
delivery. In the former case the assignment
was made "in trust for the benefit of the
wife," and did not appear to have been
known to the trustee or cestui que trust.
There was no delivery and no valuable consideration to support the trust. And so
in the latter case the policy, though handed to the wife and afterwards assigned to
her in writing, could not operate as a
valid transfer because there was no intent
on her part to receive it. The policy was
assigned to her without her knowledge
and not until his death did she know of it.
Both the supposed assignments lack the
"valuable consideration" which is necessary in the absence of delivery. The sole
consideration was natural love and affection, and this, in the absence of delivery,
is held to be insufficient. Kennedy'sexecutors v. Ware, 1 Barr 445. Lough's estate, supra. In this respect the case at
bar is clearly distinguishable from the two
cases just alluded to.
Now as to the question of fraud. In
McOutcheon's Appeal, 99 Pa. 133, Mr.
Justice Green says that it is only in the
case of the assignment of a policy that
once belonged to the assured, that the
question of fraud can arise under the act
of April 15, 1868. If the assignment was
made in good faith and without fraud, it
would prevail, even against creditors.
Was this then a bona fide assignment?
Was the decedent guilty of any fraud?
We think not. The counsel for the plaintiff argue that because the decedent was
therefore
"conscious
of insolvency,"
his conveyance was necessarily fraudulent as to creditors. But we are told in
McqCutcheon's appeal, supra, that the .mere
fact that the assignor is insolvent at the
time of making tile assignment does not
warrant the inference that the assignment
was in fraud of creditors. It may, notwithstanding, have been made in good
faith and without fraud. Ii this cannot
justify the inference in the case at bar,

then what can? The decedent inay possibly have had an intention to defraud,
but there is not the slightest evidence of
it, and we therefore decline again to surcharge the administrator.
MALCOLM B. STERRETT, J.
JOHN HARPER vs. ADAM KOONS.
Executors and Administrators-Insolvent
e .tate-Negotiable instruments-Liability of administratorfor wrongful appropriation of land converted by intestate
to his own use.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Abram Koons, having a bond of $1000
payable to Harper or bearer from John
Harris, which Harper had put in- his
hands to deposit in his safe, borrowed
$400 from William Stine and delivered the
bond as collateral security, Stine supposingit to belong to Koond.
Before repaying Stine, Abram Koons
died, Adam Koons becoming his administrator. Adam, supposing the bond to belong to Abram, redeemed it by paying
Stine $400 and interest and then collected
the bond from Harris.
Harper then brought suit against Adam
individually for the $1000 collected on the
bond. Abram Kood's Estate was insolvent, paying only 40 cents on the dollar.
The money used byAdamn in payingStine's
debt was money of the estate. He had
notyet filed an account.
STERRETT and ELmES for the plaintiff.
The bond, at no time, belonged to the
estate. Reducing it to money and applying it to the payment-of decedent's debts
fixes a personal liability on the administrator. Collin's admr. v. Weiser, 12 S. &
R. 97; Persch v. Quiggle, 57 Pa. 247.
DAVIS and HOUSER for the defendant.
The administrator exercised properskill
and care in the redemption and collection
of the bond and cannot be held personally
liable therefor, Dillbaugh's Estate, 4 Watts
179; Wiley's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 246; Schott
v. Sage, 4 Phila. 87.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The controversy in the case of John
Harper v. Adam Koons seems to arise
from the action of Abraham Koons, who
took the property of John Harper and
pledged it as his own. Before redeeming
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the pledge Abraham Koons dies, Adam
Koons, his administrator, redeems the
pledge and places the money received for
the bond in the general distribution fund.
Harper now brings action to recover the
same from Adam Koons, personally.
The leading proposition seems to be
whether Adam Koons is responsible personally for the money so collected and
turned into the general distributing fund.
We are inclined to think not.
Where an executor or an administrator
makes a distribution of part of the assets
of an insolvent estate, before filing his
:ccount, he is liable for the sum so distributed. "Cessna's Estate, 192 Pa. 14."
We, however, do not think that in the case
at bar, Adam Koons made such a distributinn. He, under the impression that
thd bond in question was the property of
the decedent, paid out $400 from the fund
of the estate, and in return for this paid
back $1000. On these grounds we do not
think Adam Koons is liable for the sum
thus paid out.
The next point we will discuss is
whether or not Adam Koons was guilty of
negligence in not discovering that the
bond in question was not the property of
the decedent. We do not think so. Tle
law on this point seems to be that all personal property found on the premises, not
otherwise accounted for, is the property of
the decedent. Therefore Adam Koons
was not guilty of negligence in assuming
that the bond was the property of Abraham Koons. If Adam Koons was not
guilty of negligence we do not see how
he can be personally liable for the sum
since an executor or an administrator can
be held liable only for the assets coming
into his hands, or N;here hehas done some
act which is the equivalent of admitTing
that such assets came into his hands and
then only when he has culpably and negligently parted with the same. Irwin's
Appeal, 35 Pa. 294. From this we derive
that Adam Koons could be liable only were
he guilty of negligence or should culpably
or negligently part with the assets of the
estate, which is not the case, since the
money derived from the sale of the land
has been turned into the general distributing fund of the estate.
We do not think that this action lies
against Adam Koons personally. The
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proper action to bring, we think, would
be against Adam Koons as administrator.
We therefore grant the prayer of the defendants and enter a non suit against the
plainitiff.
F. J. -JAUBENSTEIN, P. J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

T'e bond had belonged to Harper, and
nothing done by Abraham Koons, or by
Adam Koons, destroyed that ownership.
Assuming to own it, however, either individually or representatively, Adam
Koons collected it, and appropriated the
money to some other use than that of Harper. The act of so appropriating it was his.
If it was wrongful, he personally is responsible for it. It would not be congruous to
hold Koons, as adiministrator, liable for an
act committed by himself. Schottv. Sage,
4 Phila. 87. Cf. Wengert v. Baseiore, 1
P. & W. 232. His ignorance of Harper's
ownership, on one hand, and the fact that
Koons' action on the assumption that the
bond belonged to the deceased was precisely
what his duty as administrator would have
required hiqi to do, do not make the collection of the bond and the retention oft he
proceeds for administration purposes, anything else than his own individual act,
for which as an individual, he is responsible to Harper. He may have a right to
be indemnified from the estate of the decedent, but this is entirely consistent with
his liability to Harper.
It may be supposed that Koons is protected by the negotiable character of the
bond. The bond let us suppose was negotiable because issued since the passage
of the recent Negotiable Instrument act.
Had Abram Koons been a bona fide purchaser, for value, he would have had a
good title to it.
But Abram did not
buy it at all. He was mere custodian
of it and committed a breach of trust,
when he pledged it to Stine for his
own debt. Is Adam Koons' position better? He did not purchase the bond. He
intended, as administrator, to pay the debt
for which it wats pledged, and thus to redeem it. In doing so, he employed the
assets of the estate. It is true that he employed more of these assets than he was
warranted in doing, the estate being insolvent, since he paid Stine's debt in full.
As lie cannot recover from Stine any of this.
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money he will be personally a loser of the
difference between what would have been
Stinte's pro rata share and $400, if Harper
is permitted to recover. This doesnot, however, make him a purchaser, nor entitle
him to the advantages of a purchaser in
his contest with Harper. When he paid
Stine, he intended to redeem the bond for
the estate and he employed what was and
what he considered to be, its money. That
he was mistaken, does not help him. One
of two innocent persons must suffer. Harper has done nothing to justify the translation of the loss to himself. Or, at all
events, whether he has or not, should be
submitted to the jury. Cf. Royal Areanum v. Cornelius, 198 Pa. 46.
It might be that Harper knowing of the
death of Abram Koons, and of his having.
had his negotiable bond, should have given
notice to Adam Koons, that the bond was
his. It does not appear that Harper knew
of Abram Koons' death, until after the redemption of the bond from Stine. But,
even if he did know of Abram's death,
yet neglected to warn Adam, he will be
entitled to recover the $1000 less whatever
sum, in excess of the proper ratable share,
Stine received. The estate would pay 40
per cent. Stine would, as creditor, have
been entitled to $160. He received $240
too much, and for this amount Adam will
be surchargeable, when he settles his account. There is no reason why he should,
having collected $760 which did not belong
to the estate, either keep it himself, or distribute it among creditors. It follows
that the nonsuit was erroneously entered.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.
ADAM MONTFORT vs. JACOB
SHOLER.
Trespass on property-Votice to leaveAmount of force allowable in removing
an intruder.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Montfort was trespassing with a gun on
Sholer's farm, when the latter requested
him to leave. Montfort said he would not.
Sholer then retired, and in fifteen minutes returned armed with a gun, and said
he would give Montfort fifteen minutes to
begin to move toward the fence, and if lie
did not do so in that time, he would shoot

him. Montfort said that he did not intend
to budge, and said "I dare you to shoot."
After the fifieen minutes had elapsed,
Sholer again requested Montfort to go, but
.e said, as before, "I will not, and I dare
you to shoot." Sholer then shot, seriously
wounding Montfort in the leg with shot.
This is trespass for $300 damages.
DEVEIR and GERIiER for plaintiff.
Only reasonable force may beused by th(e
owner in removingan intruder. This case'
is distinguished from cases where (lefence
of castle is involved. Coin. v. Moorelzn(,
9 W. N. C. 272; 121 Pa. 165; Am. & Jng.
Col. 984.
DONAHOE and HOAGLAND for d~fendant.
Self defence extends to the defence of
one's property. He may resist with a
deadly weapon a trespasser with a deadly
weapon. Com. v. Donahoe, 148 Mass. 5251;
People v. Dann, 53 Mich. 491; Ayers v.
State, 60 Miss. 709.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Montfort was trespassing with agun on
Sholer's farm, when the latter requested
him toleave. Montfort saidhe would not.
Sholer then retired and in fifteen minutes
returned again with a gun, and said lie
would give Montfort fifteen minutes to
begin to move toward the fence, and if lie
did not do so in that time, he would shoot
hin. Montfort replied that he did not intend to budge and added: "I dare you to
shoot." After the fifteen minutes had
elapsed Sholer again requested Montfort to
go, but he said as before, "I will not and
I dare you to shoot." Sholer then shot,
seriously wounding Montfort in tile leg
with the shot.
This is trespass for three hundred dollars
damage.
The recovery in this case must depend
upon the character of the trespass, and
whether or not the means employed by the
defendant were justifiable and proper.
The counsel for the defence urge that the
trespass was one likely to put theplaintiff
in fear of bodily harm, and lead him to believe that not only his property, but his
home was in danger; that he wasjustifiable
in resisting with a deadly weapon a trespasser who comes upon his premises thus
armed. To suipport their position they
cite, 76 Wis. 298; 148 Mass. 529; 63 Mich.
491; 60 Miss. 709, and various other cases
of like character. But in these cases there
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was either actual violence, or threats of the
same, and in some instances the attacks
were in the night time. At all events
there were positive acts that would reasonably cause fear of bodily harm, or injury
to property.
Cam we say that Montfort had such
cause of fear as to induce him to resort to
such extreme measures? It appears that
he was upon the land of Sholer, presumably in the daytime, and had in his possession a gun. He was ordered to leave
but refused to do so. He did not make
any threat, nor did he attempt to use the
gun in any manner to the injury of the defendant. It is a well known principle
that when a man's castle is invaded strong
measures may be taken to repel the intruder when there is reasonable apprehension
of danger. Even assault and battery may
be justified in, the defence of lands and
goods, but unless trespass is accompanied
with violence, it is held in some cases that
the owner of land will not be warranted
in assaulting the trespasser.
In Com. v. Clark the rule was laid down
that a man, after requesting the intruder
to leave the premises, and upon the refusal
to comply, the owner may use reasonable
force for the purpose of removing him.
Self defence is a primary law of nature,
and it is an excuse for a breach of the peace
and even homicide, but care must be taken
not to exceed the bounds of reason, for
then the defender would himself become
the aggressor. 6 Cont. 453. But a civil
trespasser will not justify the firing of a
gun at him in order to compel him to
leave. 5 Denio 450.
Although Montfort had a gun in his possession, refused to leave, and even dared
the defendant to shoot, yet in the absence
of any threats on his part, or aggression of
any sort, we fail to see any possibleexcuse
for the use of firearms to compel him to
leave.
Therefore, in consideration of the above
authorities and the peculiar circumstances
surrounding this case, we would instruct
the jury to find a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, leaving to them the measure of
damages, up to the amount asked for.
E. H. BROCK, J.

WM. COBURN vs. JOHN McCANN.
Action for damag.s-Abating private
nuisance-Bight to compensationfor restoring injured property to its former
condition-Fallingin of retainingwall.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Astreet ran up a steep hill. On one side
of the street McCann had a lot 80 ft. wide,
and immediately below his, Coburn had
one 100 ft.wide. McCann building a home
on his lot, 40 ft. wide, left a space 40 ft. in
width between its wall nearest Coburn,
and the division line. This space he filled
up with earth in orderto make the lot level,
so that of the boundary line between the
lots after the filling, McCann's was 8 ft.
higher than Coburn. McCann undertook
to keep the earth from fallinginto Coburn's
lot by a retaining wall, which was so weak
as to break in two or three places, and allow earth to fall on Coburn. To prevent
further break, Coburn deemed it necessary
to build and built an additional wall, one
foot thick on his own land. He sues McCann for the falling in of the earth, and
for the damage for the liability of other
earth to fall in, resulting in his erection of
the wall. The wall cost $200 to build. The
lot was worth in the market $90 afront foot.
KLINE and MILLER for plaintiffeited.

Rheav. Forsyth, 37 Pa. 503; Crosland v.
Pottsville, 126 Pa. 51]; Water Co. v. Iron
Co., 84 Pa. 277.
MAYS

and PEIGHTEL for

defendant

cited.
Coal Co. v. Ingram, 39 Pa. 164; Eshelman v. Township, 152 Pa. 68; Sanderson v.
Coal Co., 102 Pa. 370; Bare v. Hoffman, 79
Pa. 71.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is one of the many cases which are
brought into court to receive compensation
for damages, because one person is unjustly
enriched at the expense of his neighbor.
In this case, as in many others, the disputing parties owned adjoining lots.
These lots were situated on a hill-side, the
defendant McCann's lot on the higher elevation, and the plaintiff Coburn's lot
immediately below. The defendant filled
iti his lot with ground making it about
eight feet higher than the plaintiff's lot.
To keep the ground from falling into
Coburn's lot, the defendant built a retain-
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ing wall, which was so weak that it had
broken through at several places allowing
the earth to fall into Coburn's lot. To
prevent further break, Coburn deemned it
necessary to erect a wall one foot thick on
hisown land. He then brought this action
against McCann fordamage., sustained by
the falling in of the earth, and for the
liability of other earth falling in, resulting
in the erection of the wall. The cost of
the wall was$200 and the property was
worth $90 afoot front. This action, we see,
is not brought to recover the expense of
erecting the wall, but it is to recover the
reasonable damage sustained by the fallin)g
in of the earth, resulting in the erection of
the wall. $200 is not to be considered
as the damage sustained by the plaintiff,
but it may aid in considering the damage
which would have resulted had the wall
not been erected. If$200 is found to be the
reasonable damage which would lmve resulted, then $200 can be recovered; but if a
less amount is considered to be the damage
which would have been sustained, then
that less amount can be recovered. This
opinion is upheld in McKnight v..Denny,
198 Pa. 323.
We think, both justly and lawfully,
that the plaintiff Coburn can recover the
reasonable amount of damage which he
would have sustained.
FRANK RHODES, J.

COMMONWEALTH vs. HOLMES.
Mfurder committed in perpetrationof burglary-Accessory before thefact-Act of
M1arch 81, 1860-Motion for new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Holmes and Jacobs concerted to commit
burglary and robbery in the house of John
Tate. Before doing so, they armed themselves, but distinctly agreed that in no
event were they to use their fire-arms, except against officers of the law, in case of
need. While Holmes was rummaging
through a downstairs room of the house,
Jacobs entered Tate's bed-room, who,
aroused, drew a pistol from under his pillow and fired at Jacobs, and was about to
fire again when Jacobsfired and killed h im.
Holmes being caught, Jacobs escaping,
was put on trial for murder and found

guilty of murder in the first degree. The
court declined the point that the act. of
..Jacobs would notbe imputed to Holmes,
and that the killing was therefore not by
Holmes. Motion for new trial.
LONGBOTTOM and STAUFFER for Connionwealth.
Murder committed in attempt to perpetrate burglary is murder in the first degree. Act March 31, 1860. P & L vol. 1,
Cols. 1274 and 1099.
The confederates are equally guilty.
PEople v. Hodges, 27 Cal. 340; Coin. v.
CapIlbell, 84 Pa. 187; Com. v. Brandt, 94
Pa. 290.
KEELOR and SCHANZ for defendant
cited:
People v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112; Bishop
crini. Law, vol 1. 240; Rex v. Havkins, 3
C & P. 626.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

All murder, in Pennsylvania, committed
in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, burglary, is murder in the first
degree. Holmes was a principal to the
burglary, to which the murder becarn a
concomitant part. One who makes himself responsible for an unlawful act, which
in itself, is malum in se makes himself responsible for the entire consequences,
whether contemplated or accidental,
which not unusually attend or follow it.
When armed felons in the commission
of an overt act, are suddenly confronted
by an unexpected (anger, human impulse
to use those arms in their own defence is
too strong to be controlled by a previous
agreement to the contrary; and to permit
an acquittal, or even a new trial, on such
ground, would be to vitiate the whole
force of our statute. The motion for the
new trial is therefore over-ruled.
LOGAN, J.
COMMONWEALTH vs. JOHN
TARLEY.
Joinder qfcounts in an indictment-Admission of counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Tarley was indicted first for stealing a
bond of S1000, second for embezzling it.
At the trial it was admitted by his counsel
that he had embezzled but the stealing
was denied. Counsel for the Common-
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wealth used the admission in argument
and in his charge the Court also reminded
the jury of the admission and told theii
that it was strong evidence. ,The verdict
was guilty on the second count.
lotion
for new trial because first, of misjoinder of
counts, second, the use made of admission
of counsel.
LAU1BENSTEIN and MACCONNEL for
Commonwealth.
Admissions of counsel in open court are
evidence against the prisoner, and may be
used by the jury as the basis of a verdict.
Commonwealth vs. McMurray, 198 Pa. 51.
The counts in this indictment are properly joined. Harmon v. Commonwealth,
12 S. &R. 69; Huston's Appeal, 69 Pa. 485;
Henwood v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. 424.
MCINTIRE and TMoKEEHAN for defendant cited.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Phila. 189;
Fullaw v. Rose. 160 Pa. 47; Sampson v.
Sampson, 4 S. & R. 332.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Tarley was indicted first for stedling a
bond of $1,000, second for embezzling it.
At the trial it was admitted by counsel
that he had embezzled but the stealing
was denied. Counsel for the Commonwealth used the admission in argument
and in his charge the court also reminded
thiejury of the admission and told them
it was strong evidence. The verdict was
guilty on the second count. Motion for a
new trial because first, of misjoinder of
counts; second, the use made of the admission of counsel.
We will consider the claim of misjoinder
of counts first.
The rule against the joinder of felony
and misdemeanor exists now, only where
the offences are repugnant in their nature
and legal incidents, and the trial and
judgment so incongruous as to deprive the
defendant of some legal advantage.
There is no doubt of the propriety' of
joining them where the felony includes
the misdemeanor as il rape, with which
may be joined a count for an assault with
intent to ravish.
As a general rule larceny and embezzlement may, when relating to the same
teansaction, be joined in separate counts
of the same indictmenP. Ency. of Pleading and Practice, subject Larceny, and
when so joined they may be tried separately or together at the discretion of the
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court before which the trial takes place.
The rule as to misjoinder rests on a technicality which will not stand in the way
when the interests of the defendant are
not jeoparded. Sentence may be passed
on any one count and a inisjoinder would
be thereby tolled. Henway & Arney v.
Coin., !2 Pa. 424.
We will now consider the effects of the
use made of the admission of counsel. In
the trial of causes the admissions of counsel, as to matters to le proved, are constantly received and acted upon. They
may dispense with proof of facts for which
witnesses would otherwise be called. They
may limit the demand made or the set-off
claimed. Indeed any faed bearing upon
the issues involved, admitted by counsel,
may be the ground of the court's procedure
equally as if established by the clearest
proof. This has been held by our Supreme
Court in numerous cases. In Somers v.
Balabrega, it was ruled that "An attorney's agreement to refer binds his client,"
1 Dallas 164. "An attorney's admissions
bind his clientif theyare within thescope
of his authority;" 5 Watts 275. "Counsel
may waive the proving offacts in civil
cases, such as the execution and delivery
of an instrument sued on," Hilner v. Battin, 27 Pa. 517.
A like rule prevails in other states as in
Greiss v. Inlvestment Co., 93 Cal. 411. The
court held that oral admissions may be
acted upon by the court in giving judgment or in its instructions to the jury.
Had defendant himself admitted the embezzlementno onexwould question the right
of the court to refer to it in his charge and
it would be very strong evidence as it
would dispense with further proof," but
counsel represent their client and their admissions are primafacie his admissions.
This is so in criminal cases when made at
the trial in open court and in his presence.
Conmmonwealth v. MeS~urray 198 Pa. 61;
Greenleaf on Evidence, 39.
We therefore see no injustice to defendant in the joinder of counts or use made
of admission of counsel and a new trial is
accordingly refuse'd.
PHILIP

T.

LONERGAN, J,
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than the supposed promissory note. While
we must admit the admission of a debt lhy
the debtor is very strong evidence, it would
Promissory note- Evidence of debt-be a very simple method of disposing of
estate.
Decedent's
creditors' claims to allow a debtor to acknowledge a supposed claim or write a
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
promissory note in favor of a relative or
Among the papers of XVandel, found
some near friend.
after his death, was a paper dated and
In this case the sister has not presented
signed three months before his death, statany claim. If the sister had been the
ing, "For money received from my sister
holder of the note no doubt the evidence
Jane, I owe her $10,000, which I intend to
would have been more conclusive as to the
Hehad
pay at my earliestopportunity."
existence of the debt. If it were so that a
told a brother, Thomas, about the same
person could write a promisory for any
tine, that he owed the money and requestamount it would work gross injustice to
ed him to remember what he said. He
creditors. All a debtor would be required
had also stated to Thomas that he would
to do in order to lessen the creditors' claims
find a paper, as described, among his bewould be to write out a promissory note
longings should he die. Charles Wandel
payable to an immediate friend or near rewas indebted to others to the extent of
lation fora sufficient amount to practically
$6,000 and his assets equalled $7,800. Jane
annul a creditor's claim. The conversation
insisted on a dividend along with the
between Wandel and his brother was not
other creditors. The creditors claimed to
sufficient to validate the claim. As was
be paid in full to the exclusion of her, allegsaid in McKowan's Estate, 198 Pa. 102,
ing that her debt was not established.
the note, not having been delivered durAnother sister claimed that Jane's claim
ing the life time of the testator, could only
should be disregarded, and the residual be -regarded as evidence of the debt, not
$1,800 should be distributed pro rata be- as the debt itself.
tween the brother and two sisters, as next
Being indebted to the a mountof $6,000,
of kin.
it is very improbable he would become insolvent to that extent in three months,
LONEERGAN and CORE for plaintiff.
the time elapsed from the making of this
If, coupled with the acknowledgment
of the debt, there be that which iniports a
note till his death. And his assets being
promise to pay, it is a promissory note.
only $7,800. it is hardly likely he would
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Subject, Bills
give a note for $10.000 when lie knew his
and Notes; 126 Mass. 343.
Declarations and admissions of deedent
finances were in such conditin. Taking
are competent evidence to bind the estate.
into consideration all the circumstances,
Robert's Appeal, 126 Pa. 102; Hass' Estate,
he must have known he was insolvent or
11 Phila. 185.
would soon become insalvent when lie
ORARY and RHODES, F., for creditors
wrote this note.
and heirs.
The iiote reading payable at my earliest
To make an admission of debt binding
opportunity, lie could not be sued upon it
it should be made to the party himself or
when Jane thought it was his opportunity.
his known agent. 17 Pa. 286, 4 Barr 323,
120 Pa. 170.
Certainly Jane could not judge and it is
There must be more evidence than the safe to say he could not be sued upon the
undelivered note and declarations of denote during his lifetime. And if lie could
ceased to establish a valid claim. 198 Pa.
not be sued upon it during his life time
102.
If no action could be maintained against
his estate cannot be sued upon it after his
Wandel while living, none is maintainable
death. Who is to be judge of his earliest
against his estate. 4 W. N. C. 252.
opportunity or when his earliest opportunOPINION OF THE COURT.
ity hasarrived? Certainly not now, when
his assets are only $7,800 and his liabilities
It is the opinion of the court that this
$6,000, can be said to be a good opportunity
claim should not be allowed, as the sister
in29 Pa. 352,
or his earliest opportunity.
to whom the note was made payable esNelson v. Von Boauborst the court said,
tablished no claim against the estate.
"No action will lie under such an underThere is no otherevidence of the debt other
CHAS. WANDEL'S ESTATE.
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taking even though the court and jury
find he is able to pay as by the terms of
the contract he is to be judge of the time of
payment.
In 198 Pa. 102, McKowan's Estate, no
action can be maintained on a judgment
note of a decedent drawn in favor of his
sister and found among his papers after
death, never having been delivered, upon
the testimony of a witness to the effect
that decedent had told hird three years
after date of the note and when testator
was hopelessly insolvent, that he had left
a note payable to hissister and where there
is no other evidence that the decedent
actually owed his sister anything.
J. 0. ADAMSoN, J.

in the will that is to govern and this is
to be judged of exclusively by the words
of I he instrument as applied to thesubject
matter and surrounding circumstances.
In the first place it is not realty but the
proceeds of realty which is personalty that
the testator John Caldwell bequeathed to
his "children or their heirs."
In Hoch's Estate, 154 Pa. 422 it is said
that the intestate laws must control questions of distribution arising upon the
settlement of the estate of a testator as well
as of intestate unless the testator clearly
provided a different mode in his will.
Has he provided a different mode from
that prescribed by the intestate laws in
the present case?
The will says "to my children or their
heirs," what is the meaning of "or their
TRESCOTT vs. COPE.
heirs"? In Ashburner's Estate, 159 Pa.
545 it is held that the word heirs when
Wils-Construction-_feaningof-"Tomy
used in cases of this kind means persons
children or their heirs"-Distribution. upon whom the law would cast the estate
in cases of intestacy.
From this it follows that the will could
STATEMENT OF TILE CASE.
be
read-to my children or those who
Estate of John Caldwell, deceased.
would take under the intestate laws if
Caldwell left a will, wherein he devised "to
they should die intestate.
my children or their heirs, the proceeds of
Applying this rule to the case in hand,
my farm, which I direct my executor to
the
auditor is of the opinion that Samdel
sell within six months after my death."
Trescott is entitled to one-half of his wife's
When Caldwell died, his sons John and
share or oue-sixth of the proceeds, also that
Vm. survived him. His daughter Jennie
Jacob Cope is entitled to the entire partof
had died a month before him, leaving her
his wife's share, there being no issue, or
husband, Samuel Trescott, and a daughi n other words one-sixth of the proceeds of
ter, Mary Trescott, to survive, and before
the sale.
the sale and distribution of the proceeds,
JOSEPH RHODES, Auditor.
Mary died, leaving a husband, Jacob Cope,
but no issue. The proceeds of the land
DERRY vs. HECK.
undergoing distribution, Samuel Trescott
claimed one sixth. Jacob Cope denied his
right to anything and claimed one third.
LOGAN and AmEs for plaintiff.
The word heirs means the person upon
whom the law would cast the estate in
cas6 of intestacy. Hoch's estate, 154 Pa.
117; Swede's estate, 10 Pa. C. C. 463.
CONRY and BIsHoP for defendant.
AUDITOR'S REPORT.
In deciding this case we must follow the
rule laid down by Justice Trunkey in
Porter's Appeal, 94 Pa. 336, where he
says, "The intention of the testator is the
prevailing consideration in applying all
rules of construction."
Itis theintention of the testator expressed

Specific performance-Recovery of purchase money of land-Jurisdiction of
equity.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Derry contracted to sell his farm to Heck
for $2750, and before the delivery of possession of it to repair the house on it.
Derry already owed $450 to Heck, but he
alleges that Heck agreed that this should
not be set off against the price of the land,
but should be allowed to remain unpaid
for some time.
When the time for delivering the deed
and paying the purchase money came,
Derry tendered the deed and demanded
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the $2,750, having already repaired the
house. Heck refused to pay more than
$2,300, but offered -to return Derry's note
for the $450. Derry declined to accept the
tender, withheld the deed and filed this
bill in equity for specific performance.
The jurisdiction of equity was challenged
by a demurrer.
ADAMSON and LAUBENSTEIN for plaintiff.
Recovery in damages is not an adequate
remedy for the sale of land. Finley v.
Aiken, 1 Grant 83; Houser v. Lamont, 55
Pa. 311; Gillmer v. Darr, 141 Pa. 505.
DAvis and MOON for defendant.
A bill, seeking decree for payment of
purchase money, will not lie when there
is an adequate remedy at law. Kauffman's Appeal, 55 Pa. 38.5; Swartz's Appeal,
99 Pa. 310; Dorff v. Schmunk, 197 Pa. 298.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This bill in equity for specific performance for the recovery of the purchase
money of land arises upon a contract for
the sale of said land, the terms of the contract being as follows: Derry contracted to
sell his farm to Heck for $2,750 and to repair the house on it. Derry owed Heck
$450, but he alleges Heck agreed this
shbuld not be set off against the price of
the land. Derry at the proper time tendered the deed to Heck and demanded
$2,750. Heck refused to pay more than
$2,300, but offered to return the note of
$450 due him from Derry. Derry declined
to accept the tender, withheld the deed
and filed a bill -in equity for specific performance. The jurisdiction of equity was
challenged by a demurrer.
Only one question of l-w presents itself
in this action for our determination, viz.,
Have the courts of equity jurisdiction to
decree specific performance for the recovery merely of purchase money of land; or
had the plaintiff an adequate remedy at
law?
If the court of equity has jurisdiction in
this action, it must derive such power from
Act of June 16, 1836. The sixth section of
article 20 of said act provides for "the afkording specific relief when a recovery in
damages would be an inadequate remedy."
Whether or not an adequate remedy exists at law we will consider later. In
Bakewell v. Kerr, 11 W. N. of C., the
Court said: "In Pennsylvania, we do not

have any equitable jurisdiction except
where it is specifically granted, and we
must therefore look to the constitution and
the various Acts of Assembly to determine
our authority and not to the general powers
of the Courts of Chancery."
As we have not been able to find any
other authority than that given by the
sixth section of the Act of June 16, 1836,
the plaintiff's bill must either be sustained
or fail on that section.
A court of equity will not interfere to
redress any injury for which there is an
ample remedy at law. Gallagher v. Fayette County R. R. Co., 38 Penna. 102.
And as was said in North Shore R. R. Co.
v. Pittsburg, etc., R. W. Co., 193 Pa. 641,
the supreme court is not disposed to encourage the trial in equity of actions of
which courts of law have jurisdiction
under the constitution.
In Dalzell v. Crawford, 1 Parsons 37, it
was held the specific execution ofa real
contract in equity is not of absolute right
in the party asking it, but of sound discretion in the court. Justice King in this
action uttered the following in his opinion:
"That where a recovery in damages would
not be an adequate remedy for the assertion of the plaintiff's rights under a contract for the sale of land, the courts having equity powers in this state will entertain jurisdiction of the cause." Also in a
later case decided in 1854, Finley v. Alken,
1 Grant 83, is a similar ruling by Justice
Lowrie. In this case Justice Black filed
an able dissenting opinion and Justice
Knox concurred.. Justice Agnew in a later
decision remarks that the conclusion arrived at in Finley v. Aiken, 1 Grant 83,
applied to that case alone by reason of the
particular facts of the case. JusticeBlack
in his dissenting opinion criticised the decision in Dalzell v. Crawford, 1 Parsons
37, as follows:
"'The ability of thatopinion is not denied
and our respect for its author is not one
whit diminished by the fact that li never
was on this bench. But as a common pleas
decision, it has no force of authority that
can bind us to a conclusion from which
our deliberative convictions impel us to
dissent."
The following language was
used by Justice Agnew in Kauffman's
Appeal, 55 Pa., "It is not to be doubted
that in many cases in England, and some
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in this state, a vendor may come intoequity
for specific performance to compel a yen-.
dee to pay purchase money. But in no
case in this court, so far as we have found,
has a decree for specific performance been
made in favor of vendor simply for the
payment of money; when there has been
nothing else in the case than is ordinarily
set forth in a declaration in debt, covenan t
or assumpsit to entitle a plaintiff to a
judgment at law for the purchase money."
Justice Agnew after speaking concerni,)g
another case refers to Finley v. Aiken,
thus: "Finley v. Aiken, 1 Grant 83, is less
positive in its.character and was the subject of a strong dissent, and an able opinion
by Black, J., in which Knox, J., conIn Dech's Appeal, 57 Pa. 467,
curred."
Justice Agnew held, "That where a bill
for specific performance by a vendor is
simply to obtain purchase money, it will
not be entertained."
In Swartz's Appeal, 99 Pa. 310, Justice
Mercur declares the correctness of the later
decisions in the following words: "The
relief sought in this case is clearly wi, hi u
the rule which denies equity jurisdiction.
It is to compel appellant to pay for the
land.the sum he agreed to pay therefr.
After he tenders the deed an action at J:,w
will give to the appellees a full, complete
and adequate remedy for a recovery of the
purchase money to which they may ie
entitled." The latest case we are able to
find on this subject is Dorif v. Schmunk,
197 Pa. 298.
In this case Justice McCullom criticises
Finley v. Aiken, 1 Grant 83, and states the
law to be as follows: "When there is nothing whatever in the circumsta'nces of the
case requiring the aid of chancery to give
effect to a contract, and the bill forspecific
performanceis simply an action and nothing more to recover l)urchase money, we
will not entertain it." This is the undoubted rule in Pennsylvania notwithstanding the elaborate discussion of Mr.
Justice Lowrie to the contrary in Finley
v. Aiken.
Mr. Justice Black filed an able dissenting opinion in this case and the decision
stands on its facts alone. Weare of opinion that the legal principle laid down in
Finley v. Aiken, supra, and Dalzell v.
Crawford, 1 Parsons is not the law at present in Pennsylvania; that these cases have

been thoroughly uprooted and overturned
by the later decisions in Pennsylvania.
Not only have these two cases been overruled by the later decisions, but the case of
Dalzell v. Crawford, supra, at best is only
a lower court decision, and the case of
Finley v. Aiken, supra, has been repeatedly held to apply only to the particular facts
of that case. We, therefore, come to the
conclusion, in view of the later cases, that
a bill in equity for specific performance
for the recovery of purchase money of
land is not within the power of a court of
equity to decree, because a full, complete
and adequate remedy exists at law.
A further objection to the bill is, that the
granting of such a decree would practically
repeal the Act of 1842, prohibiting imprisonment for debt. For if the defendant
should refuse to obey the decree, the court
would have power to send him to prison,
and detain him there until he complied
with the decree of the court.
The bill is dismissed.
WILLIAM H.

POINTS, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Specific performance of contracts for tle
sale of land is one of the familiar objects of
equity, and neither the English cases, nor
those of the American States generally,
distinguish between a bill by the vendee,
and a bill by the vendor. It is thought in
England and these States that the remedy
must be "mutual"; i. e., that, if one party
to a contract can enforce it in equity, so
should the other be able to enforce it. 22
Am. &Eng. Ency. 947. In a number of
instances in Pennsylvania the courts formerly permitted the vendor to obtain a decree in equity, for the payment by the
vendge, of the purchase money; Finley v.
Aiken, I Gr. 83, but Black, J. in that case
strongly dissented, on the ground that the
common law through the medium of ajury
furnished an adequate remedy and that it
was not the intention of thelegislature, in
conferring the power in equity to afford
"special relief, when a recovery in damages would be an inadequate remedy," to
confer the power to specifically execute
the vendee's contract to pay the purchase
money.
Later cases, as the learned court below
has well shown in its carefully and lucidly
written opinion, have adopted the point of
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view of Justice Black, a point of view still
occupied by the Supreme Court so late as
theyear 1900, Dorffv Schmunk, 197 Pa.
299; although it is not pretended that a
"recovery in damages" is an "adequate
remedy" to the vendor. What he wants,
is not to retain the land and obtain conipensation for the loss of his bargain, but to
recover the exact sum contracted to be
paid, upon a tender by him of a conveyance. Whether this sum comes to him
through the verdictof a jury, or the decree
of a chancellor it is in no just sense, "damages." The judgment of the law court, no
less than the decree of the court of equity,
is a judgment for specific performance.
The statute of 1836 confers the power of
specific relief when damages would be all
inadequate remedy.
Since 18-54, when Justice Black's dissen ting opinion was written, there has been a
vast increase of the activity of the equity
courts and an incidental broadening of
His attachment to
their jurisdiction.
jury trials is now but imperfectly felt, and
faith in the wisdom or justice of that small
fragment of the people that happens to
find itself impanelled in any case, is not
so fervent as that which he professed to
feel. The growing frequency of the use of
the bill in equity is expressive of a deepening distrust of the capacity of juries to
administer justice. While so many interests are regulated by the chancellor
without a jury, it hardly seems worth
while to preserve the anomaly of denying
to a vendor in Pennsylvania, despite the
example of so many other states that profess as great a reverence for juries as we do,
the power to enforce payment of the purchase money from his vendee. But until
the highest court of the state shall change
its view, we must hold, with the court below, that a vendor's bill purely for money
cannot be entertained.
The fact that the vendee, despite his
agreement, insisted on retaining so much
of the purchase money as equalled the
vendor's debt to him, did not constitute a
fact that could confer jurisdiction in an
equity court. The object of the bill was
simply to obtain money.
Appeal dismissed.

JOHN WARREN vs. SAMUEL CLAY.
N\egotiable instruments-Accommodation
maker-Misappropriationof proceedsEffect of holder's knowledge of intended
use-Act of -May 15, 1901.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Win. Thorpe was indebted to a son of
Clay to the extent of $1,000. He applied
to Samuel Clay to become maker, for his
accommodation, of a note for that amount
saying that the money got on it he would
pay over to Clay, Jr. The note was drawn
by Clay to the order of Thorpe, and was
by Thorpe negotiated to Warren who paid
$1,000 for it less the discount. Warren
knew of the object for which Clay had executed the note and supposed that Thorpe
was going to carry it out when he gave
Thorpe the money. The money was,
however, used by Thorpe for a totally different purpose. In assumpsit by Warren,
Clay defends on this ground.
HA IBrLIN and WRIGHT for plaintiff.
Warren was a holder in due course, for
value, and without such notice as the law
requires in order to shift the liability on
him. Act May 15, 1901; Lord v. Ocean
Bank, 20 Pa. 384; Phillips v. Patterson, 168
Pa. 468; Musser v. Criswell, 150 Pa. 409.
GRoss and YEAGLEY for defendant.
The holder of the note, Warren, was acquainted with the condition on which it
was made, therefore not an innocent purchaser, for valueand without notice. Royer
v. Bank, 83 Pa. 249; Carpenter v. Bank,
106 Pa. 170; Boggs v. Lancaster Bank, 7
W. & S. 331; First National Bank v. Rogers,
198 Pa. 627.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Warren, having discounted a note payable to Thorpe, and paid the proceeds over
to him, now seeks to recover the amount so
paid from Samuel Clay, accommodation
maker of the note in question. Samuel
Clay defends on the grounds that when lie
executed the note Thorpe had told him
that "the money got on it he would pay
over to Clay, Jr.," to whom he was indebted, but that Thorpe, after receiving
the money, had used it for a totally different purpose; that Warren knew of the object for which Clayhad executed the note,
and since its proceeds had not been applied
to the carrying out of the expressed intention of Thorpe, Warren cannot recover.
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It is admitted that Warren, beside knowing of the object for the note's execution,
supposed that Thorpe was going to carry
it out when he gave him the money. Will
this mere knowledge on the part of Warren
prevent him from recovering money, the
proceeds of which was actually paid into
the hands of Thorpe and its payment accompanied with the belief that it would,
as a matter of honor, be paid by Thorpe in
the agreed channel? We think not. When
Clay, Sr., executed the note in favor of
Thorpe he did so because he was influenced
by his representations as to the disposition
of the proceeds raised from it.
That
Thorpe perpetrated a gross fraud on Clay
and that his conduct evidenced an entire
absence of honor cannot be doubted. It is
clear that as between the original parties,
Clay, Sr., and Thorpe, the latter would
have no standing to maintain an action.
But Clay, Sr., trusted Thorpe in the beginning. He believed that the money
realized would be devoted to its alleged
purpose. In pursuance of this belief he
IQaned his credit to the extent of $1,000.
Can he, who had such implicit confidence
in his friend that he would, knowing all
the facts of the case and the necessity of
endorsement, shift the loss upon one who
has parted with something more than
mere credit when lie paid oaver the money,
simply because lie knew of the prior
arra;jgement? It would, indeed, be a peculiar law which would relieve one who,
knowing of the indebtedness of his friend
and his inability to make immediate payment has such an abiding faith in his
integrity that he pledges his credit in his
behalf, and shift the loss, if any, upon one,
who, in the ordinary course of business
discounts that note and attempt to explain
this shifting of responsibility by saying
that the discounter knew where the proceeds were ultimately supposed to go; that
they did not reach the destination in the
contemplation of the endors3r and he,
therefore, ought not to be held liable.
Credit is loaned for a purpose; its purpose
to relieve present embarrassment; money
is an immediate necessity; that money
must be obtained from someone. A discounts the note and pays over all of the
proceeds. He knows, or at least suspects,
that the one presenting it desires the proceeds to apply to his business in some form

or another. He is said to become a holder
in good faith and for value. Add to this
suspicion the knowledge of the identity of
the person to be paid with the proceeds,
and say that this identification causes a
shifting of responsibility and you compel
a discounter, in order to protect himself, to
actually accompany the payee and see that
proper disposition is made. No case has
yet gone to such an extreme. We refer to
a representative case where recovery has
not been allowed to show that that line of
cases are to be distinguished, in an important particular, from the case at bar. In
First National Bank v. Rogers, 198 Pa.
627, the defendant accepted a draft drawn
upon them for $2,400 by the Valentine
Iron Co. for the purpose of enabling payment of freight charges and that purpose
was known to the bank. The bank discounted the draft and applied the proceeds
to the payment of an overdraft by the Iron
Co. It was held that if the bank, with
knowledge of these facts, joined with
Robert Valentine in misapplying the proceeds and appropriating them not only to
another use, but to its own use, the verdict
found for the defendant ought to stabd.
So in this case, if Warren had with notice
applied the proceeds to the payment of a
debt due himself by Thorpe, or had colluded with him in the misapplication of
the money he was not a bona fide purchaser, but we are advised that he actually
paid the money to Thorpe believing that
the prior expressed purpose would be carried out. We cannot infer any collusion
between Warren and Thorpe in such a
transaction.
There remains to consider the question
of consideration. Between the original
parties the accommodation paperwould be
open to the defence of want of consideration, but when transferred in the usual
course of business, even to those who knew
the character of the paper, that defence
cannot be made. Such a loan of credit is
held to be without restriction as to the
uses to which it may be applied. Carpenter v. Bank, 106 Pa. 170; Act May 15, 1901,
Art. II Sec. 29. "He who chooses to put
himself in the front of a negotiable instrument for the benefit of his friend must
abide the consequences, and has no more
right to complain if his friend accommodates himself by pledging it for an. old
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debt, than if he had used it in any other
way." Twining v. Hunt, 7 W. N. 0.223;
Lord v. Ocean Bank, 20 Pa. 384.
Judgment is therefore entered for the
plaintiff.
ffILLIAm E. ELMES,
J.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

In this case one administrator, unbe-

known to his co-administrator, pledged
stock and a horse belonging to the estate
and used the proceeds for his own debts.
The co-administrator now files this petition to compel the pledgee to return the
ARTER vs. SHELDON.
pledge.
In settling up an estate it is the duty of
Pledge of stock by joint administrator the administrator to pay the debts out of
without the knowledge of co-administrat- the personal property and if any residue
or- Right of surviving administratorto remain, it to go to the distributees, 1 P. &
follow pledge - Liability of pledgor's L. 1522. In doing so he ias the right to
estate.
sell or pledge the personalty to pay debts.
Hence,in this case,when the administrator
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
brought the stocks to Sheldon to bepledged
Philip Arter died, leaving among his
Sheldon acted in perfect good faith in acassets four horses and a certificate for four
cepting them. "The fact that the legal
tile to the stock was known to have preshares of stock in bank. Two adminisviously been in the adlministrator and that
trators were appointed, John and Henry
Arter. Henry, being the active adininis- the title of the holder appeared on its face
trator, one year after obtaining the letters,
to have been derived from him in his repborrowed $1,000 from Amos Sheldon, stat- resentative capacity does not raise a susing that it was for the estate and signed a
picion or put a purchaser on inquiry fur
note as administrator, at the same time
the reason that it is the adminis rator's
primary duty to dispose of the assets and
depositing the horses and the shares of
stock as security. Henry used the money
settle the estate." 92 Pa. 379. Hence it
forihis ownpersonal purposesand died, not
would be a great injustice if the pledgee,
having repaid it or redeemed the horses or
acting in good faith and with noknowledge
of any fraud oi the part of the adminiscertificates.
The other administrator,
John, then filed a petition in the Orphans'
trator, were compelled to give back the
stock. 198 Pa. 600, 9, Pa. 379, 11 S. & R.
court asking for a citation to Sheldon to
show cause why he should not return the
377. The proper remedy in this case would
goods to petitioners. Sheldon admitted
have been for John Arter to briughisaction
possession of them, butalleged that he had
against the estate of Henry Arter.
lent the money to Henry, administrator,
Under the facts and the law in this case
for the use of the estate and that he should
we conclude that the petition should be
not be compelled to restore the articles
dismissed. The petition is therefore displedged until the money was repaid him.
missed.
ROBERT H. MOON, J.
He also demurred to the jurisdiction of the
OPINION OF THE SUPREM1E COURT.
court. The money borrowed by Henry
Two questions arise in this case, one of
was not in fact needed by him as adminprocedure and the other of substantive
istrator and John had no knowledge of the
right. The petition is presented to the
transaction.
SHERBINE and WATswN for plaintiff Orphans' court, and it is contended that
that court has not jurisdiction of one not
cited:
executor or administrator, who has possesPetrie v. Clark, 11 S. & R. 377; Miller v.
sion of the assets of the deceased. This,
Edge, 8 Pa. 352; Williams on Executors
we think, is an error. "All persons,"
Pg. 8-4; Ellis' Appeal, 8 W. N. C. 538.
remarked Justice Dean, "are amenable to
VASTINE and WANNER for defendant.
the jurisdiction (of the Orphans' court)
An executor or administrator has
authority to pledge l)er.sona l)rol)erty of
who have possessiol ofthe trust property."
the esttite; the eo-execentor is resp(,isiile
Watts' Estate, 158 Pa. 1; Brooke's Appeal,
for pledgor's act and the pledgee, without
102 Pa. 150; Odd Fellows' Savings Bank's
notice, may hold the pledged property.
Appeal, 123 Pa. 356. The common pleas
Wood v. Smith, 92 Pa. 379; Schell v.
Depervin, 198 Ca. 600.
would doubtless have jurisdiction in tres-
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pass or replevin, at the suit of a proper
party;or byabillin equity. Ellis'Appeal,
8 W. N. C. 538, Cf., Schell v. Depreven,
198 Pa. 600. The Orphans' court, therefore, had jurisd ctiou of the petition. We
must consider, then, whether Sheldon acquired a title to the horses and shares of
stock.
The borrowing on the pledge of these
assets was made by one of the two executors. That one of them has such power is
not to be doubted. One can receive paynient of a debt, may satisfy a mortgage due
to the decedent. Devling v. Little, 26 Pa.
502; Fesmire v. Shannon, 143 Pa. 201; may
sell a leasehold or goods and chattels: 2
William's Executors, p. 143; Schell v.
Depreven, 198 Pa. 600. As there can be a
sale outright, so there can be a mortgage
or pledge by executors. 2 William's Executors, 121, 138, and what all can do, in this
respect, one of them can do. Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa. 379. The title of Sheldon is
not to be impugned because he obtained
the goods from but one of the executors.
The borrowing of money was an act
within the power of an executor. So was
the giving of the demanded security, including the pledge or assignment. The
vendee of, or the lender on pledge of
money to, the executor, is not bound to see
to the proper application by the latter of
the price paid or of the money lent. 2
William's Executors, 122; Wood's Appeal,
92 Pa. 379. For a misappropriation of this
money the party dealing with the executor is responsible only when he knew or
suspected that it was intended, or would
have done so, but for negligence. We are
unable to discoverin the case before us any
negligence on the part of Sheldon. He
had a right to retain the horses and the
shares of stock until the payment of the
money borrowed. The plaintiff's petition
was properly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

WARREN vs. FINLEN.
Bailment- ConditionalSaleand distincion-Replevin.

Definition

STA.TE3MENT OF THE CASE.

John Warren made a contract ternied a
lease of a horse for $125 to be paid at the
rate of $15 for the first month and $10

monthly thereafter. The horse to be returned on demand if at any time the installment should not be paid within three
(lays after it was due. A second clause in
the agreement recited, "It is further agreed
that if at the end of twelve mouths the
$125 shall have been paid, Warren will on
request make a bill of sale of the horse to
Finlen, whereupon the horse shall become
and be Finlen's and cease to be Warren's."
It also provided that, "if at theend of any
month Finlen should have paid up all installnents then due and should pay the
repidue of the $12.5, Warren should make a
bill of sale to him." During the fourth
month the horse was levied on as Finlen's
and sold to his brother, Win. Finlen, who
declined to contioue payment of installments and said the horse was his. The
creditor on whose execution the sale occurred had lent money to Finlen and obtained judgment and issued execution
without knowledge of the contract with
Warren or of Warren's previous ownership. Defendant bought at sheriff's sale
in equal ignorance, Warren brings an action of replevin.
EBBERT and JONES for plaintiff.
Where there is a stipulation that payment is for the use, the vendee receives the
property as bailee and the title does not
pass until the full price is paid. Enlow v.
Klein, 105 Pa. 488; Becker v. Smith, 85 Pa.
469; Clark v. Jack, 7 Watts 375; Piano Co.
v. Parker, 155 Pa. 208.
LE Roy DELANEY and HICKERNELL for
defendant.
Without a stipulation for a return of the
property at the end of the term and the
payment of an additional sum whereupon
title shall pass, the transaction is asale and
not a bailment. Stadtfelt v. Huntsman,
92 Pa. 53; Ott v. Sweatman, 166iPa. 217;
Brunswick v. Hoover, 95 Pa. 508.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

We have before us the question of determining whether the agreement entered
into between the plaintiff and defendant's
brother was a lease or a conditional sale.
The first proposition therefore before us for
consideration is to ascertain whether the
title to the horse became vested in defenda rt's brother or was lie a niere bailee of the
horse? If we find the former condition to
exist, the action brought will not be supported, otherwise we must sustain the
plaintiff's position. A bailment has been

THE FORUM
defined to be a delivery of something of a
personal nature by one party to another to
be held according to, the purpose or object
of the delivery and to be returned or delivered over when that purpose is accomplished. A conditional sale is defined to
be such a sale wherein the transfer of the
title is made to depend upon the performance of a condition. To view the case
briefly we find the following facts before us:
The plaintiff, one Warren, contracts "to
lease" to Finlen a horse for $125, to be paid
$15 for the first month and $10 monthly
thereafter until the balance was paid
whereupon plaintiff was to make a bill of
sale to Finlen for the horse. In default of
payment of any one of the installments the
horse was to be returned.
A further clause provided that at any
time during that period or at the end of
any month if Finlen should pay the balance of the $125 he was to receive a bill of
sale for the horse. The plaintiff's counsel
cite as a parallel case Enlow v. Kline, 105
Pa. 488. In this case there was an agreenMent between Enlow and Kline whereby
Enlow was to furnish a team of horses for
Moutz but the owner was to havefull control and management over the property
while it was being used by Moutz. At no
time was there an intention or act of relinquishment of ownership. No present
interest was created in Moutz. There was
an express stipulation in the agreement
that the property was to be managed and
belong to Enlqw until he had derived
therefrom certain revenue when he would
relinquish the ownership. The case at bar
may be distinguished from this case for
the following reasons:
First, there was a delivery of the property; second, there was a relinquishment
of control; third, Warren made no provision to insure himself against the loss of
the property.
In an earlier casein Pennsylvania, 92 Pa.
55, Stadtfield v. Huntsman & Co., a case
upon which the later decisions are based,
Mr. Justice Paxson in delivering the
opinion of the court says, ''Ithas long been
the established rule in Pennsylvania that
a sale and delivery of personal property
with an agreement that the ownership
shall remain in the vendor until the purchase money is paid, is fraudulent and
void as to creditors of the vendee, and in-

nocent purchasers." Here, then, we have
the analogy of the principle of law with
the facts of the case at bar. In the above
case certain personal property was delivered and received by one Carpenter, the
agreement being that the person enjoying
the property was to pay the sum of five
dollars per week until a certain amount
was paid. The goods were to remain the
property of the deliverer until the full
amount was paid and were subject to removal for failure to pay. The court held
that replevin would not lie on an action
brought by original owner against the execution creditor of the recipient of the
property as the transaction was a sale and
not a bailment. The terms of the agreement between, Warren and Finlen in the
case at hand show clearly it was not a
contract for hiring.
The following clause clearly defines this
point: "If at the end of any month IFinlen
pays the entire sum of the $125, Warren
will make a bill of sale to him." The law
does not regard what term or name might
be applied to a transaction but it bases its
finding upon the facts and conditions of
the transaction, what the actors have done
and the result of their actions.
Is this then not a sale with the condition
annexed "upon payment of full consideration or payment of the balance due?"
The plaintiffs counsel cites in his brief
the case of Edwards v. Ward, 10.5 Pa. 103,
which is authority for this statement of
the law, "To constitutea bailment iieither
payment for use -fgoods nor promise to
return them is essential," but in that case
the agreement fixed the time for the return of the property, payment or not; and
further it must be understood in reference
to a case where a bailnent is linjited, in
which case, if not returned, the bailor may
resort to his legal remedies to recover possession.

In Stephens v. Gifford. 137 Pa.

219, a later case than the above, Mr. Justice Williams says. "It is the e.ssence of
the contract of bailment that the article
bailed be returned in its own or some altered form to the bailor. so that he niav
have his own again." rn the case before
us there was no stipulation for its return
at the end of the year or when the last
payment was made. It was to be surrendered only upon filhre to pay. Wethink
the case of Stadtfield v. Huntsman & Co.,
rules the case under our consideration.
There is no principle of law better settled
in Pennsylvania than that a sale and delivery of personal property, where, as between vendor and vendee, the agreement
is that the ownership shall remain in
the former until all the purchase money
is paid. enables creditorsof vendeetoseize
and sell the same for payment of hisdebts.
Judgment must therefore be entered for
defendant.
N. RUSSEL TURNER, J.

